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ABSTRACT
Public expenditure reduction in Italy is achieved through a revision of social security and health care programmes. In
particular,  public health expenditure control has been implemented through a  reform that imposes more stringent budget rules at
local level and a considerable reduction in the grants-in-aid from central government. The response to a decrease in categorical lump-
sum grants from the central to local governments might result in an asymmetrical response to intergovernmental grants: local
spending is highly responsive to increases in grants, but it is relatively insensitive to grants reduction  [Stine, 1994; Gramkhar and
Oates, 1996].
In our paper we have estimated this hypothesis using  a sample of cross-sectional and time- observations covering the 20
Italian regions over the period 1989-1993. Two different models have been estimated based on different budget balance rules. The
empirical results of our model show the existence of a standard and a super flypaper effect in both models. The introduction of the
soft-budget constraint hypothesis results in a stronger effect of grants and a lower response of own resources which shows that before
reducing expenditure regional governments prefer to incur some deficit.
JEL: H51, H72, H77.
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The reduction of expenditure at any government level is of paramount impor-
tance in states where de…cit and debt have considerably risen in recent years.
For some states such as Italy the rules are even more stringent due to the ne-
cessity to comply with international agreements relating to the creation of the
European Union1.
In Italy, public expenditure control has followed two main directions: the
review of social security and health expenditure programmes and more stringent
budget rules at local level.
In recent years in fact local governments have faced an increasing …scal pres-
sure due to the reduction in categorical lump-sum transfers from central to local
governments and these changes have direct implications for local …nancing deci-
sions. A typical …nding in the empirical literature on this topic is the tendency
for expenditure response to a decrease in categorical lump-sum grants from the
central to local governments to be lower than an equivalent decrease in local
private income, the so-called ‡ypaper e¤ect [Gramlich, 1977]. Furthermore, this
…nding may be generalised to include the asymmetry in the response to inter-
governmental grants: local spending is highly responsive to increases in grants,
but it is relatively insensitive to grants reduction [Stine, 1994; Gramkhar and
Oates, 1996].
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether regional health care spending
is highly responsive to these cuts in intergovernmental grants, both in magni-
1Italy has agreed to the Maastricht which …xes the ceiling for the debt/GDP ratio at 60%
and at 3% the ratio of de…cit to GDP.
1tude [Gramlich, 1989] and in sign [Stine, 1994]. To do this, a sample of cross-
sectional and time observations covering the 20 Italian regions over the period
1989-1993 has been used. The model has been speci…cally applied to regional
health care expenditure which represents a large amount of total expenditure
at local level.
The issue is particularly important from a policy point of view because
of the reforms that have a¤ected health care in Italy and of the new rules
to allocate equalisation relating to public expenditure control, e¢ciency and
equity in providing health care at local level. Health care provision in Italy is
a right granted by the Constitution; public provision has to be kept above a
minimum level and the central government is always responsible if the regions
cannot supply an adequate service.
The remain of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
health care system in Italy; Section 3 gives a brief description of the model and
the hypotheses employed to empirically investigate the ‡ypaper e¤ect; Section
4 discusses the econometric speci…cation of the model, the dataset and the esti-
mating procedure; Section 5 outlines the results of the econometric estimation
and …nally Section 6 o¤ers some concluding comments.
22 The Italian Health Care System
The SSN (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) in Italy was …rst reformed in 1978 to
provide comprehensive health insurance coverage and uniform health bene…ts
for all citizens and legal residents.
The system was organised on three levels: the Ministry of Health, which
is responsible for planning, budgeting and general administration, 20 Regional
Health Authorities, and 200 local health agencies. Regional governments be-
come responsible for delivering services and ensuring the provision of health
care to all the citizens in their jurisdiction. The reform of 1978 delegated the
operational side of the delivery to USL (Unità Sanitarie Locali) which were
responsible for all aspects of health care from prevention to food control to hos-
pital care. The SSN was funded from three main sources: a earmarked payroll
tax, a grant from general taxation and copayments. Each regional government
received a share of the national current expenditure budget and distributed it
to their USLs following a complicated formula based on population and past ex-
penditure levels. These revenue resources, however, did not exhaust the ways in
which regions may …nanced public health care. In fact, soft-budget constraints
[Kornai, 1980, 1986] allowed regions to spend more than what they received
from the central government, without any credible punishment.
The need to reduce and rationalise public expenditure has driven Central
Government to reform health care provision once more. From 1992 a series of
reforms have a¤ected the SSN. For our analysis, the most important points are:
² The function of purchasing and providing are separated through the cre-
ation of ASL (Aziende Sanitarie Locali, the purchasers) and Aziende Os-
pedale ( the providers);
² Hospitals are reimbured with a prospective payment system which used
3the DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups) methodology to de…ne the product;
² Regional governments enjoy more autonomy since the payroll tax has been
substituted by IRAP (Imposta Regionale Attività Produttive), a tax on
value added produced at regional level;
² Regions can decide the quantity and the mix of services to be provided.
The only constraint is to secure a minimum level of coverage to their
population.
From a policy point of view the new season of local autonomy will have
important consequences on the level of health care produced at regional level.
While …scal autonomy and expenditure determination are important, it is also
of paramount importance to study the e¤ect on equity, and in particular on
horizontal equity of these reforms. The Italian government has already taken
some measures in this direction with the introduction of an equalisation grant
to regional government whose rules are under discussion at present.
Given the importance of the regional government in this decisions process it
is of particular interest to study their expenditure decisions in order to evaluate
the e¤ects of this reform. The funding system foresees a considerable shift from
grants-in-aid to local resources. These sources of …nance have a di¤erent impact
on expenditure growth as noted in the introduction.
In the following section we present a model that can be implemented to
study these issues.
43 The model
The aim of this paper is to test regional public health care expenditure responses
to di¤erent sources of …nance and whether asymmetric responses to decreases
in intergovernmental grants exist. Our analysis builds on Stine (1994) and
Gamkhar and Oates (1996) and extends these approaches in two directions:
…rst, we focus our attention on the public provision of only one good: health
care; secondly, we take account of the Italian SSN characteristics by introducing
the hypothesis of the soft-budget constraint.
The model is based on the decision of a utility maximising median voter;
a majority voting process exists and politicians, in order to be elected, have
to appeal to the median voter. The decisive voter selects the quantities of a
composite private good, X, and of public health care, H, in order to maximise a
twice di¤erentiable and quasi-concave utility function, U = U (X;H), subject to
his budget constraint. Denoting the prices of the private good and the publicly
provided health care respectively by PX and PH, the median voter’s budget
constraint is equal to:
Y = PXX + PHHN¡d (1)
where Y is total private income; N is population; and d is the congestion
factor which measures the ‘degree of publicness’ of the publicly provided good.
Up to 1998, the greater share of public health care in Italy was …nanced from
central government grants. Furthermore, during the relevant period regions
were characterised by a soft-budget constraint, S, which allowed them to spend
more than what they received from the central government, without any credible
punishment. Hence, the individual’s budget constraint could be rede…ned as:
Y = PXX + (PHH ¡ G ¡ S)N¡d (2)
5that is, central government block-grant to the regional authority, G, and the
soft-budget constraint reduced the individual’s required tax payment.
These assumptions allow us to derive the demand for public health care
expenditure2. We assume that when faced with the linear budget constraint
(2), the decisive voter’s utility maximising quantity of public health care expen-
diture depends on his income, on intergovernmental grants3, and on a vector
of other socio-economic determinants. In particular, population older than 65
is used as a factor which increases health spending: as people get older the
amount of health care delivered to them is expected to increase Furthermore,
since public and private health care can be shown not to be perfect substitutes
[Gouveia, 1996, 1997], we include private expenditure as an independent vari-
able to investigate whether larger private spending causes lower public health
care expenditure.
In linear form the expenditure function for publicly provided health care
may be written as:
H = ®1 + ®2I + ®3A + ®4P + ®5G (3)
where H is per capita health care expenditure; I is the median voter’s
income; A is the percentage of population aged 65 and over; P is private health
care expenditure; and G is intergovernmental grants.
3.1 Asymmetrical response
The literature on the ‡ypaper e¤ect suggests that a number of reasons might
cause lead to an asymmetric response to changes in intergovernmental grants.
2See, for example, Gouveia (1996, 1997).
3The latter variable reduces the tax burden for the median voter.
6Gramlich (1987), for example, suggests that public expenditure is often related
to clientele behaviour that makes its reduction problematic. Stine (1994) studies
the response of own source revenue and concludes that …scal illusion, ‡ypaper
e¤ects and interest groups might determine an asymmetric response to a change
in intergovernmental grants. Finally, Goodspeed (1998) …nds that a decrease
in aid has a less pronounced e¤ect on expenditure. Gamkhar and Oates (1996)
instead argue that an asymmetric response is not supported by the empirical
…ndings.
These authors suggest to test for the existence of an asymmetric response
by using a model that in our case can be written as:
H = ®1 + ®2I + ®3A + ®4P + ®5G + ®6D(Gt ¡ Gt¡1) (4)
where D is a dummy which takes on a value of zero if grants are non-
decreasing and a value of one otherwise. Under the null hypothesis of asym-
metrical response to increases and cuts in grants, the parameter ®6 will be
zero.
3.2 Soft budget constraint
In Italy, regional health expenditures are …nanced by contributions from workers
and health tax, by patient co-payment, and by grant-in-aid from the central
government. A further source of funding is represented by regional soft-budget
constraints [Kornai, 1980, 1986]. These occur whenever regions are expected
to be bailed out in the case they spend more than their own budget constraint
would allow.
Although Kornai’s original description of the soft-budget constraint involved
government bailouts of loss-making …rms, this has been extended to analyse
…nancial system srtucture [Dewatripont-Maskin, 1995], corporate governance
7[Povel, 1997], and federalism [Qian and Roland, 1998], but to our concern there
is no application to the e¤ects of the soft-budget constraint on the composition
of public expenditure. This is expected to be modi…ed when regions are allowed
to spend more than what they received from the central government, without
any credible punishment.
In order to take account of both this e¤ect on public health care expenditure
and of the existence of an asymmetric response, the model to be estimated can
be written as:
H = ®1 + ®2I + ®3A + ®4P + ®5G + ®6D(Gt ¡ Gt¡1) + ®7S (5)
where S is the amount of regional de…cit.
84 Data and Methodology
The data used are from several sources and cover public expenditure and other
main indicators at regional level for the period 1989-1993. In our estimation we
use data for the period 1990-1993 since one year is needed to create the relevant
dummy for grants-in-aid. The database comprises the 20 administrative regions
of Italy with the exception of Valle d’Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige. These
two regions have a special administrative regime and the rules to allocate funds
have changed in 1993. In order to keep a balanced pool of data we have not
included them in the sample. The repeated changes in budget and grant setting
rules did not allow us to use longer series.
For our analysis we have collected other indicators of need and output at
regional level, but in a preliminary analysis they did not prove to be signi…cant
in explaining expenditure.
Most variables are expressed in real per capita terms. The only variable
that cannot be expressed in these terms is POP65, i.e. the ratio of population
which is over 65. Our dependent variable, EXP, measures the number of units
of expenditure in public health services per capita at the regional level. It
represents the sum of the main components, namely
² Labour costs (LAB)
² Cost for services (SER)
² Cost for pharmaceuticals (FAR)
² Cost for medical services (MED)
² Cost for out-patient treatments (INT)
² Cost for hospital services (HOS)
9² Cost for out-patiens (EXT)
² Other costs (OTH)
such that:
EXPt = LABt + SERt + FARt + MEDt + INTt + HOSt + EXTt + OTHt
Grants-in-aid, FSN, are represented by the amount of the Fondo Sanitario
Nazionale which is allocated to each region each year, GDP is the estimation of
per capita GDP at regional level and is used here as a proxy for income, CSAN
is the amount spent by consumers for the purchase of private health, and DEF
is the di¤erence between expenditure and resources. Since regions in Italy, in
the period considered received funds for health only through grants-in-aid, we
can write that:
DEFt = EXPt ¡ FSNt
We use the accounting convention of de…ning de…cit as a positive variable
and surplus as a negative quantity. Data are shown in Table 1
[TABLE 1 HERE]
The model presented in the previous section is now tested empirically using
a sample of cross-sectional and time- observations covering the 20 Italian regions
over the period 1989-1993. To test for the existence of an asymmetric response
and for the presence of a soft budget constraint the following two equations are
estimated:
EXP = ®1 + ®2GDPit + ®3POP65it + ®4CSANit + ®5FSNit +
®6Dit (FSNit ¡ FSNit¡1) + uit (6)
10where uit is the disturbance term and:
EXP = ¯1 + ¯2GDPit + ¯3POP65it + ¯4CSANit + ¯5FSNit +
¯6Dit (FSNit ¡ FSNit¡1) + ¯7DEFit + uit (7)
which takes account of the soft budget constraint hypothesis.
115 Empirical Results
Estimation of equations (6) and (7) is undertaken for each year individually and
in panels by pooling time series for each region. To test the hypothesis that
data can be pooled, we cannot use the cointegration procedures suggested by the
most recent literature since our panel has a prevalent cross-section extension.
For this reason, we perform F-tests on the null hypothesis that the coe¢cients
for each variable in equations (6) and (7) are the same for each year. Table 2
shows the results of the tests; the null hypothesis of equal coe¢cients could not
be rejected in either case, therefore we can pool the data.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Becker (1996) suggests that the estimation of the ‡ypaper e¤ect is sensitive
to functional form; in order to avoid misspeci…cation biases, it is important to
test for the functional form.
Previous research in public expenditure often used a log linear functional
form; however this speci…cation violates the adding up constraint [Anderton et.
al.,1992], i.e. to have expenditure consistent with the budget all components
should be expressed in logarithmic terms. Since the studies on other types
of expenditure assume a linear form there is no reason to assume a di¤erent
functional form for health care. In any case, we have performed the Box-Cox
test for the OLS and the pooled model which shows that the correct form is
linear. The results of these tests are presented in Table 2. The RESET test
performed on the OLS model shows the presence of heteroschedasticity; for this
reason we have used the estimation procedure proposed by Greene (1993) which
employs a set of assumptions on the disturbance covariance matrix appropriate
for our estimation. The model used assumes the following structure for the
residuals:
12² E ("it) = ¾2
i
² E ("it;"jt) = 0
² "it = ½i"i;t¡1
The …rst assumption corresponds to the hypothesis of heteroschedasticity
among our residuals; the second assumption corresponds to cross section inde-
pendence of the residuals while the third assumption corresponds to autocorre-
lation of the residuals4.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 show the results for the model in which regional governments are
assumed to be faced with a hard budget constraint. The Buse R2 shows that
52% of the variance is explained; this is the most appropriate test to use for
a goodness of …t with our estimation procedure. All the variables are statisti-
cally signi…cant; only POP65 and CSAN have a degree of signi…cance below
5%; however tests for their inclusion show that they are important variables.
Other socio-economic indicators were not included in the regression because an
exploratory analysis showed that their contribution to explaining health care
expenditure was marginal.
The sign of POP65 is negative; in this respect our estimation is in line with
Gouveia (1996) who argues that the negative correlation between this variable
and expenditure is due to the relationship between the median voter and ageing
population. According to Gouveia, vote participation declines with age; hence
the state is less prone to make the interests of older people. In our sample this
sign might be due to a certain degree of multicollinearity with GDP. In fact,
4The autocorrelation in the residuals is a typical assumption in estimating public expen-
diture because of the incremental budgeting decisions implied by choices in the public sector.
13the regions in the North of Italy are characterised by high level of income, but
they are also the areas where the population is more aged.
The elasticity of health care to GDP is 0.24 which is about half the elasticity
of expenditure to grants-in-aid. This result is in line with standard ‡ypaper
theory which suggests that lump-sum grants-in-aid have a greater marginal
impact on expenditure than private local income.
The asymmetric e¤ect (super ‡ypaper e¤ect in Stine’s terminology) is con-
…rmed by the sign and signi…cance of a6. The sign of the variable is positive, but
the e¤ect is correctly negative since the variable is expressed in negative values.
However, the elasticity of this variable is not very high, something that might
suggest that the variable is statistically signi…cant, but its economic impact is
rather low.
Finally, it is interesting to note that private health care consumption has
a negative sign; this variable has an anticyclical response to public health care
since it satis…es all the demand that the public sector cannot meet.
Let us now turn to the model which allows local authorities to incur in some
de…cit. The results are presented in Table 4.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
The goodness of …t of this model is better than for the hard budget speci-
…cation. For this estimation, all the variables have the expected sign; CSAN
increases its signi…cance while POP65 is signi…cant at 90%. The elasticity to
grants-in-aid is now much higher and is about …ve times income elasticity. This
con…rms that before reducing expenditure regional government prefers to incur
some de…cit. The asymmetric response is con…rmed from a statistical point of
view, but the economic signi…cance of the variable is very marginal (the elas-
ticity is 0.009). In general, the dependent variable seems to be more sensitive
14to other source of …nance while it is less responsive to socio-economic variables.
156 Conclusions
The reduction of expenditure at any government level is of paramount impor-
tance in countries such as Italy where public de…cits and debt have a consid-
erable weight and impose a sever burden on economic development. In Italy,
public health expenditure control has been implemented through a reform that
imposes more stringent budget rules at the local level.
Regional authorities have then faced an increasing …scal pressure due to the
reduction in categorical lump-sum grants from the central government. Changes
in grants from higher levels of government have direct implications for local …-
nancing decisions. However, the usual response to a decrease in categorical
lump-sum grants from the central to local governments is lower than the re-
sponse to an equivalent decrease in local private income [Gramlich, 1977]. Fur-
thermore, this …nding is generalised to include the asymmetry in the response
to intergovernmental grants: local spending is highly responsive to increases in
grants, but it is relatively insensitive to grants reduction [Stine, 1994; Gramkhar
and Oates, 1996].
In our paper we have estimated this hypothesis using a sample of cross-
sectional and time- observations covering the 20 Italian regions over the period
1989-1993. Two di¤erent models have been estimated based on di¤erent bud-
get balance rules. The …rst one assumes the presence of a stringent budget
constraint (hard-budget hypothesis); the second one allows regions to incur in
some de…cit.
The empirical results of our model show the existence of a standard and
a super ‡ypaper e¤ect in both models. The introduction of the soft-budget
constraint hypothesis results in a stronger e¤ect of grants and a lower response
of own resources which shows that before reducing expenditure regional gov-
16ernments prefer to incur in some de…cit.
A word of caution should be spent for the sign and signi…cance of the private
health care expenditure which palys a residual role in the model. The possibility
for regional government to decrease expenditure in real terms depends on the
presence of a well developed private market which can satisfy the demand that
the public sector cannot meet. The regional di¤erences in health outlays make
this assumption rather unreasonable for the Italian case. A two speed health
care system might develop as a result of the reform proposed and avoiding this
problem might prove to be an important priority for the years to come.
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19Table 1: Definition of the variable used in the study
Variable used Definition Source MEAN ST. DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
EXP Total current per capita public health care expenditure in real terms





1446600 252280 986540 2328700
GDP GDP per capita in real terms at regional level ISTAT, Regional Accounts 21074000 5301300 12587000 29820000
FSN Grants from Central Government  per capita in real terms 1201600 162040 857300 1559900
CSAN Private consumption of health care services per capita in real terms ISTAT, Regional Accounts 935730 114920 742230 1272600
POP65 Ratio of population aged 65 and over ISTAT, Regional Accounts 16,44 3,13 10,70 25,00
DUM if  FSNt -FSNt-1 ‡O , O
if  FSNt -FSNt-1 <O , FSNt -FSNt-1
-64587 75398 -420600 0
DEF Current deficit per capita in real terms for each region 169310 94069 42953 434370Table 2. F-tests for pooling the data
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linearTable 3: Estimation of the asymmetric effect: ‘hard-budget constraint’
Variable Name Estimated coefficients Standard Error  t-ratio Elasticity at means
a1  (constant) 658690 128100 5.140 0.455
a2  (GDP) 0.0169 0.0031 5.512 0.246
a3  (FSN) 0.5630 0.1214 4.637 0.468
a4 (CSAN) -0.1593 0.0975 -1.634 -0.103
a5 (POP65) -42.8990 24.4610 -1.754 -0.049





2 0.9712Table 4: Estimation of the asymmetric effect: ‘soft-budget constraint’
Variable Name Estimated coefficients Standard Error  t-ratio Elasticity at means
a1  (constant) 272850 92930 2,9360 0,1886
a2  (GDP) 0,0099 0,0021 4,7520 0,1443
a3  (FSN) 0,8375 0,0883 9,4890 0,6957
a4 (CSAN) -0,1403 0,0467 -3,0070 -0,0908
a5 (POP65) -20,8990 17,0500 -1,2257 -0,0237
a6 (DUM) 0,2035 0,0962 2,1160 -0,0091
a7 (DEF) 0,6737 0,0793 8,4990 0,0788
LL -906.967
BUSE R
2 0.8982
R
2 0.9958